KARGIL WAR

The Kargil War, also known as the Kargil conflict,was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan that took place between May and July 1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir. The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC), which serves as the de facto border between the two states. During and directly after the war, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces, led by General Ashraf Rashid. The Indian Army, supported by the Indian Air Force, attacked the Pakistani positions and, with international diplomatic support, eventually forced withdrawal of the Pakistani forces across the LOC.

The war is one of the most recent examples of high altitude warfare in mountainous terrain, which posed significant logistical problems for the combating sides. This was only the second direct ground war between any two countries after they had developed nuclear weapons, after the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969; it is also the most recent. (India and Pakistan both test-detonated fission devices in May 1998, though the first Indian nuclear test was conducted in 1974.) The conflict led to heightened tension between the two nations and increased defence spending by India. In Pakistan, the aftermath caused instability of the government and the economy, and, on October 12, 1999, a coup d'etat by the military placed army chief Pervez Musharraf in power.

Location:

Before the Partition of India in 1947, Kargil was part of the Baltistan district of Ladakh, a sparsely populated region with diverse linguistic, ethnic and religious groups, living in isolated valleys separated by some of the world's highest mountains. The First Kashmir War (1947–48) concluded with the Line of Control (LOC) bisecting the Baltistan district, with the town and district of Kargil lying on the Indian side in the Ladakh subdivision of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. After Pakistan's defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the two nations signed the Simla Agreement promising not to engage in armed conflict with respect to that boundary.

The town of Kargil is located 205 km (120 miles) from Srinagar facing the Northern Areas across the LOC. Like other areas in the Himalayas, Kargil has a temperate climate. Summers are cool with frigid nights, while winters are long and chilly with temperatures often dropping to −48 °C (−54 °F).

An Indian national highway (NH 1) connecting Srinagar to Leh cuts through Kargil. The area that witnessed the infiltration and fighting is a 160 km long stretch of ridges overlooking this highway. The military outposts on the ridges above the highway were generally around 5,000 metres (16,000 ft) high, with a few as high as 5,485 metres (18,000 ft).Apart from the district capital, Kargil, the populated areas near the front line in the conflict included the Mushko Valley and the tiny town of Drass, southwest of Kargil, as well as the Batalik sector and other areas, northeast of Kargil.

One of the reasons why Kargil was targeted was that the terrain surrounding it, lent itself to pre-emptive seizure of unoccupied military positions. With tactically vital features and well-prepared defensive posts atop the peaks, a defender of the high ground would enjoy advantages akin to a fortress. Any attack to dislodge a defender from high ground in mountain warfare requires a far higher ratio of attackers to defenders, and the difficulties would be exacerbated by the high altitude and freezing temperatures.

Kargil was also just 173 km (108 mi) from the Pakistani-controlled town of Skardu, which was capable of providing logistical and artillery support to Pakistani combatants. In addition to these tactical advantages, the Kargil district had a Muslim majority, which may have led Pakistani forces to expect local support for the infiltration as it had been expected in Operation Gibraltar.

Background:

After the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, there had been a long period with relatively few direct armed conflicts involving the military forces of the two neighbors - notwithstanding the efforts of both nations to control the Siachen Glacier by establishing military outposts on the surrounding mountains ridges and the resulting military skirmishes in the 1980s. During the 1990s, however, escalating tensions and conflict due to separatist activities in Kashmir, some of which were supported by Pakistan, as well as the conducting of nuclear tests by both countries in 1998, led to an increasingly belligerent atmosphere. In an attempt to defuse the situation, both countries signed the Lahore Declaration in February 1999, promising to provide a peaceful and bilateral solution to the Kashmiri issue.

During the winter of 1998 -1999, some elements of the Military of Pakistan were covertly training and sending Pakistani troops and paramilitary forces, some allegedly in the guise of mujahideen, into territory on the Indian side of the LOC. The infiltration was code named "Operation Badr";its aim was to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh, and cause Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, thus forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute. Pakistan also believed that any tension in the region would internationalise the Kashmir issue, helping it to secure a speedy resolution. Yet another goal may have been to boost the morale of the decade-long rebellion in Indian Administered Kashmir by taking a proactive role. Some writers have speculated that the operation's objective may also have been as a retaliation for India's Operation Meghdoot in 1984 that seized much of Siachen Glacier.

According to India's then army chief Ved Prakash Malik, and many other scholars, much of the background planning, including construction of logistical supply routes, had been undertaken much earlier. On several occasions during the 1980s and 1990s, the army had given Pakistani leaders (namely Zia ul Haq and Benazir Bhutto) similar proposals for infiltration into the Kargil region, but the plans had been shelved for fear of drawing the nations into all-out war.

Some analysts believe that the blueprint of attack was reactivated soon after Pervez Musharraf was appointed chief of army staff in October 1998. After the war, Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan during the Kargil conflict, claimed that he was unaware of the plans, and that he first learned about the situation when he received an urgent phone call from Atal Bihari Vajpayee, his counterpart in India. Sharif attributed the plan to Musharraf and "just two or three of his cronies", a view shared by some Pakistani writers who have stated that only four generals, including Musharraf, knew of the plan.Musharraf, however, asserted that Sharif had been briefed on the Kargil operation 15 days ahead of Vajpayee's journey to Lahore on February 20.

War progress:

There were three major phases to the Kargil War. First, Pakistan infiltrated forces into the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir and occupied strategic locations enabling it to control NH1. The next stage consisted of India discovering the infiltration and mobilizing forces to respond to it. The final stage involved major battles by Indian and Pakistani forces resulting in India capturing positions held by Pakistani forces and the withdrawal of Pakistani forces back across the Line of Control.

Occupation by Pakistan:

During the winter season, due to extreme cold in the mountainous areas of Kashmir, it was a common practice for both the Indian and Pakistan Armies to abandon some forward posts on their respective sides of the LOC and to reduce patrolling of areas that may be avenues of infiltration. When weather conditions became less severe, forward posts would be reoccupied and patrolling resumed.

During February 1999, the Pakistan Army began to re-occupy the posts it had abandoned on its side of the LOC in the Kargil region, but also sent forces to occupy some posts on the Indian side of the LOC. Troops from the elite Special Services Group as well as four to seven battalions^[30][31] of the Northern Light Infantry (a paramilitary regiment not part of the regular Pakistani army at that time) covertly and overtly set up bases on the vantage points of the Indian-controlled region. According to some reports, these Pakistani forces were backed by Kashmiri guerrillas and Afghan mercenaries.

Pakistani intrusions took place in the heights of the lower Mushkoh valley, along the Marpo La ridgeline in Dras, in Kaksar near Kargil, in the Batalik sector east of the Indus river, the heights above of the Chorbatla sector where the LC turns North as well in the Turtok sector south of the Siachen area.

India discovers infiltration and mobilizes

Initially, these incursions were not detected for a number of reasons: Indian patrols were not sent into some of the areas infiltrated by the Pakistani forces and heavy artillery fire by Pakistan in some areas provided cover for the infiltrators. But by the second week of May, the ambushing of an Indian patrol team, acting on a tip-off by a local shepherd in the Batalik sector, led to the exposure of the infiltration. Initially with little knowledge of the nature or extent of the encroachment, the Indian troops in the area assumed that the infiltrators were jihadis and claimed that they would evict them within a few days. Subsequent discovery of infiltration elsewhere along the LoC, and the difference in tactics employed by the infiltrators, caused the Indian army to realize that the entire plan of attack was on a much bigger scale. The total area seized by the ingress is generally accepted to between 130 km² - 200 km²;Musharraf however, stated that 500 square miles (1,300 km²) of Indian territory was occupied.

The Government of India responded with Operation Vijay, a mobilisation of 200,000 Indian troops. However, because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted; the scale of the subsequent fighting was mostly at the regimental or battalion level. In effect, two divisions of the Indian Army, numbering 20,000, plus several thousand from the Paramilitary forces of India and the air force were deployed in the conflict zone. The total number of Indian soldiers that were involved in the military operation on the Kargil-Drass sector was thus close to 30,000. The number of infiltrators, including those providing logistical backup, has been put at approximately 5,000 at the height of the conflict. This figure includes troops from Pakistan-administered Kashmir that were involved in the war providing additional artillery support.

The Indian Air Force launched Operation Safed Sagar in support of the mobilization of Indian land forces, but its effectiveness during the war was limited by the high altitude, which in turn limited bomb loads and the number of airstrips that could be used.

The Indian Navy also readied itself for an attempted blockade of Pakistani ports (primarily Karachi port)to cut off supply routes. Later, the then-Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif disclosed that Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel to sustain itself if a full-fledged war had broken out

India attacks Pakistani Positions

The terrain of Kashmir is mountainous and at high altitudes; even the best roads, such as National Highway No. 1 (NH 1) from Leh to Srinagar, are only two lanes. The rough terrain and narrow roads slowed traffic, and the high altitude, which affected the ability of aircraft to carry loads, made control of NH 1A (the actual stretch of the highway which was under Pakistani fire) a priority for India. From their observation posts, the Pakistani forces had a clear line of sight to lay down indirect artillery fire on NH 1A, inflicting heavy casualties on the Indians. This was a serious problem for the Indian Army as the highway was its main logistical and supply route. The Pakistani shelling of the arterial road posed the threat of Leh being cut off, though an alternative (and longer) road to Leh existed via Himachal Pradesh.

The infiltrators, apart from being equipped with small arms and grenade launchers, were also armed with mortars, artillery and anti-aircraft guns. Many posts were also heavily mined, with India later stating to having recovered more than 8,000 anti-personnel mines according to an ICBL report.Pakistan's reconnaissance was done through unmanned aerial vehicles and AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radars supplied by the US.^[40] The initial Indian attacks were aimed at controlling the hills overlooking NH 1A, with high priority being given to the stretches of the highway near the town of Kargil. The majority of posts along the Line of Control were adjacent to the highway, and therefore the recapture of nearly every infiltrated post increased both the territorial gains and the security of the highway. The protection of this route and the recapture of the forward posts were thus ongoing objectives throughout the war.

The Indian Army's first priority was to recapture peaks that were in the immediate vicinity of NH1a. This resulted in Indian troops first targetting the Tiger Hill and Tololing complex in Dras, which dominated the Srinagar-Leh route.This was soon followed by the Batalik-Turtok sub-sector which provided access to Siachen Glacier. Some of the peaks that was of vital strategic importance to the Pakistani defensive troops were Point 4590 and Point 5353. While 4590 was the nearest point that had a view of NH1a, point 5353 was the the highest feature in the Dras sector, allowing the Pakistani troops to observe NH1A. The recapture of Point 4590 by Indian troops on June 14 was significant, notwithstanding the fact that Point 4590 resulting in the Indian Army suffering the most casualties in a single battle during the conflict. Though most of the posts in the vicinity of the highway were cleared by mid-June, some parts of the highway near Drass witnessed sporadic shelling until the end of the war.

An IAF plane shot down by Pakistan

Once India regained control of the hills overlooking NH 1A, the Indian Army turned to driving the invading force back across the Line of Control. The Battle of Tololing, among other assaults, slowly tilted the combat in India's favor. Nevertheless, some of the posts put up a stiff resistance, including Tiger Hill (Point 5140) that fell only later in the war. A few of the assaults occurred atop hitherto unheard of peaks – most of them unnamed with only Point numbers to differentiate them – which witnessed fierce hand to hand combat.

As the operation was fully underway, about 250 artillery guns were brought in to clear the infiltrators in the posts that were in the line of sight. The Bofors field howitzer (infamous in India due to the Bofors scandal) played a vital role, with Indian gunners making maximum use of the terrain that assisted such an attack. However, its success was limited elsewhere due to the lack of space and depth to deploy the Bofors gun.

It was in this type of terrain that aerial attacks were used with limited effectiveness. The IAF lost a MiG-27 strike aircraft which it attributed to an engine failure as well as a MiG-21 fighter which was shot down by Pakistan; Pakistan said it shot down both jets after they crossed into its and one Mi-8 helicopter to Stinger SAMs. During attacks the IAF used laser-guided bombs to destroy well-entrenched positions of the Pakistani forces.

Footage of IAF's successful strike mission on Tiger Hill.

In many vital points, neither artillery nor air power could dislodge the outposts manned by the Pakistan soldiers, who were out of visible range. The Indian Army mounted some direct frontal ground assaults which were slow and took a heavy toll given the steep ascent that had to be made on peaks as high as 18,000 feet (5,500 m). Since any daylight attack would be suicidal, all the advances had to be made under the cover of darkness, escalating the risk of freezing. Accounting for the wind chill factor, the temperatures were often as low as −11 °C to −15 °C (12 °F to 5 °F) near the mountain tops. Based on military tactics, much of the costly frontal assaults by the Indians could have been avoided if the Indian Military had chosen to blockade the supply route of the opposing force, virtually creating a siege. Such a move would have involved the Indian troops crossing the LoC as well as initiating aerial attacks on Pakistan soil, a manoeuvre India was not willing to exercise fearing an expansion of the theatre of war and reducing international support for its cause.

Two months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly retaken most of the ridges they had lost; according to official count, an estimated 75%–80% of the intruded area and nearly all high ground was back under Indian control.

World opinion

Pakistan was criticised by other countries for allowing its paramilitary forces and insurgents to cross the Line of Control's primary diplomatic response, one of plausible deniability linking the incursion to what it officially termed as "Kashmiri freedom fighters", was in the end not successful. Veteran analysts argued that the battle was fought at heights where only seasoned troops could survive, so poorly equipped freedom fighters would neither have the ability nor the wherewithal to seize land and defend it. Moreover, while the army had initially denied the involvement of its troops in the intrusion, two soldiers were awarded the Nishan-E-Haider (Pakistan's highest military honour). Another 90 soldiers were also given gallantry awards, most of them posthumously, confirming Pakistan's role in the episode. India also released taped phone conversations between the Army Chief and a senior Pakistani general where the latter is recorded saying: "the scruff of [the militants] necks is in our hands," although Pakistan dismissed it as a "total fabrication". Concurrently, Pakistan made several contradicting statements, confirming its role in Kargil, when it defended the incursions saying that the LOC itself was disputed. Pakistan also attempted to internationalize the Kashmir issue, by linking the crisis in Kargil to the larger Kashmir conflict but, such a diplomatic stance found few backers on the world stage.

As the Indian counter-attacks picked up momentum, Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif flew to meet U.S. president Bill Clinton on July 4 to obtain support from the United States. Clinton rebuked Sharif, however, and asked him to use his contacts to rein in the militants and withdraw Pakistani soldiers from Indian territory. Clinton would later reveal in his autobiography that "Sharif’s moves were perplexing" since the Indian prime minister had travelled to Lahore to promote bilateral talks aimed at resolving the Kashmir problem and "by crossing the Line of Control, Pakistan had wrecked the [bilateral] talks. the other hand, he applauded Indian restraint for not crossing the LoC and escalating the conflict into an all-out war.

G8 nations supported India and condemned the Pakistani violation of the LOC at the Cologne summit. The European Union also opposed Pakistan's violation of the LOC.China, a long-time ally of Pakistan, did not intervene in Pakistan's favour, insisting on a pullout of forces to the LoC and settling border issues peacefully. Other organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum too supported India's stand on the inviolability of the LOC.

Faced with growing international pressure, Sharif managed to pull back the remaining soldiers from Indian territory. The joint statement issued by Clinton and Sharif conveyed the need to respect the Line of Control and resume bilateral talks as the best forum to resolve all disputes.

Impact and influence of media

News footage shows the BM-21 Grad MRL system being fired in the background. The rocket barrage was aimed at Tiger Hill.

The Kargil War was significant for the impact and influence of the mass media on public opinion in both nations. Coming at a time of exploding growth in electronic journalism in India, the Kargil news stories and war footage were often telecast live on TV,^[59] and many websites provided in-depth analysis of the war. The conflict became the first "live" war in South Asia;^[60] it was given such detailed media coverage that one effect was the drumming up of jingoistic feelings.

The conflict soon turned into a news propaganda war. Press briefings by government officials of each nation produced such conflicting claims and counterclaims that an outside observer listening to both Indian and Pakistani coverage would wonder whether they were describing the same conflict. The Indian government placed a temporary news embargo on information from Pakistan, banning the telecast of the state-run Pakistani channel PTV and blocking access to online editions of the Dawn newspaper. The Pakistani media criticized this apparent curbing of freedom of the press in India, while India media claimed it was in the interest of national security. The Indian government ran advertisements in foreign publications including The Times and The Washington Post detailing Pakistan's role in supporting extremists in Kashmir in an attempt to garner political support for its position.

As the war progressed, media coverage of the conflict was more intense in India than in Pakistan. Many Indian channels showed images from the battle zone in a style reminiscent of CNN's coverage of the Gulf War (one of the shells fired by Pakistan troops even hit a Doordarshan transmission centre in Kargil while coverage continued). for India's increased coverage included the greater number of privately owned electronic media in India compared to Pakistan and relatively greater transparency in the Indian media. At a seminar in Karachi, Pakistani journalists agreed that while the Indian government had taken the press and the people into its confidence, Pakistan had not.

The print media in India and abroad was largely sympathetic to the Indian cause, with editorials in newspapers based in the west and other neutral countries observing that Pakistan was largely responsible for the conflict. Some analysts believe that Indian media, which was both larger in number and more credible, may have acted as a force multiplier for the Indian military operation in Kargil and served as a morale booster. the fighting intensified, the Pakistani version of events found little backing on the world stage. This helped India gain valuable diplomatic recognition for its position.

WMDs and the nuclear factor

Since Pakistan and India each had weapons of mass destruction, many in the international community were concerned that if the Kargil conflict intensified, it could lead to nuclear war. Both countries had tested their nuclear capability in 1998 (India conducted its first test in 1974 while it was Pakistan's first-ever nuclear test). Many pundits believed the tests to be an indication of the escalating stakes in the scenario in South Asia. When the Kargil conflict started just a year after the nuclear tests, many nations desired to end it before it intensified.

International concerns increased when Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad made a statement on May 31 warning that an escalation of the limited conflict could lead Pakistan to use "any weapon" in its arsenal. was immediately interpreted as a threat of nuclear retaliation by Pakistan in the event of an extended war, and the belief was reinforced when the leader of Pakistan's senate noted, "The purpose of developing weapons becomes meaningless if they are not used when they are needed." such ambiguous statements from officials of both countries were viewed as warnings of an impending nuclear crisis where the combatants would consider use of their limited nuclear arsenals in 'tactical' nuclear warfare in the belief that it would not have ended in mutual assured destruction, as could have occurred in a nuclear conflict between the United States and the USSR. Some experts believe that following nuclear tests in 1998, the Pakistani military was emboldened by its nuclear deterrent to markedly increase coercion against India.

The nature of the India-Pakistan conflict took a more sinister turn when the U.S. received intelligence that Pakistani nuclear warheads were being moved towards the border. Bill Clinton tried to dissuade Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif from nuclear brinkmanship, even threatening Pakistan of dire consequences. According to a White House official, Sharif seemed to be genuinely surprised by this supposed missile movement and responded that India was probably planning the same. In an article in May 2000 Dr Sanjay Badri-Maharaj claimed that India too had readied at least five nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, but could not back up this claim with any official proof.

Sensing a deteriorating military scenario, diplomatic isolation, and the risks of a larger conventional and nuclear war, Sharif ordered the Pakistani army to vacate the Kargil heights. He later claimed in his official biography that General Pervez Musharraf had moved nuclear warheads without informing him. Recently however, Pervez Musharraf revealed in his memoirs that Pakistan’s nuclear delivery system was not operational during the Kargil war; something that would have put Pakistan under serious disadvantage if the conflict went nuclear.

The threat of WMD included chemical and even biological weapons. Pakistan accused India of using chemical weapons and incendiary weapons such as napalm against the Kashmiri fighters. India, on the other hand, showcased a cache of gas masks, among other firearms, as proof that Pakistan may have been prepared to use non-conventional weapons. US official and the OPCW determined that Pakistani allegations of India using banned chemicals in its bombs were unfounded

Aftermath

India

Indian PM A.B.Vajpayee flashes the V sign after the Parliamentary elections in which his coalition emerged the victors. His handling of the Kargil crisis is believed to have played a big part in garnering the votes.

From the end of the war until February 2000, Indian stock market rose by over 30%. The next Indian national budget included major increases in military spending. There was a surge in patriotism, with many celebrities pitching in towards the Kargil cause.^[73] Indians were angered by media reports of the death of pilot Ajay Ahuja, and especially after Indian authorities reported that Ahuja had been murdered and his body mutilated by Pakistani troops. The war had produced higher than expected fatalities for the Indian military, with a sizeable percentage of them including newly commissioned officers. One month after conclusion of the Kargil war, the Atlantique Incident - where a Pakistan Navy plane was shot down by India - briefly reignited fears of a conflict between the two countries.

After the war, the Indian government severed ties with Pakistan and increased defence preparedness. India increased its defence budget as it sought to acquire more state of the art equipment.^[74] Media reported about military procurement irregularities and criticism of intelligence agencies like RAW, which failed to predict the intrusions or the identity/number of infiltrators during the war. An internal assessment report by the armed forces, published in an Indian magazine, showed several other failings, including "a sense of complacency" and being "unprepared for a conventional war" on the presumption that nuclearism would sustain peace. It also highlighted the lapses in command and control, the insufficient troop levels and the dearth of large-calibre guns like the Bofors. In 2006, retired Air Chief Marshal, A.Y. Tipnis, alleged that the Indian Army did not fully inform the government about the intrusions, adding that the army chief Ved Prakash Malik, was initially reluctant to use the full strike capability of the Indian Air Force, instead requesting only helicopter gunship support. Soon after the conflict, India also decided to complete the project - previously stalled by Pakistan - to fence the entire LOC.

The end of the Kargil conflict was followed by the 13th Indian General Elections to the Lok Sabha, which gave a decisive mandate to the NDA government. It was re-elected to power in September–October 1999 with a majority of 303 seats out of 545 in the Lok Sabha. On the diplomatic front, Indo-U.S. relations improved, as the United States appreciated Indian attempts to restrict the conflict to a limited geographic area.Relations with Israel – which had discreetly aided India with ordnance supply and matériel such as unmanned aerial vehicles and laser-guided bombs, as well as satellite imagery – also were bolstered.

Pakistan

Faced with the possibility of international isolation, the already fragile Pakistani economy was weakened further. The morale of Pakistani forces after the withdrawal declined as many units of the Northern Light Infantry suffered heavy casualties, and the government refused to acknowledge the dead bodies of its soldiers, issue that provoked outrage and protests in the Northern Areas. initially did not acknowledge many of its casualties, but Sharif later said that over 4,000 Pakistani troops were killed in the operation and that Pakistan had lost the conflict. Responding to this, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf said, "It hurts me when an ex-premier undermines his own forces," and claimed that Indian casualties were more than that of Pakistan.

Many in Pakistan had expected a victory over the Indian military based on Pakistani official reports on the war, were dismayed by the turn of events and questioned the eventual retreat. The military leadership is believed to have felt let down by the prime minister's decision to withdraw the remaining fighters. However, some authors, including ex-CENTCOM Commander Anthony Zinni, and ex-PM Nawaz Sharif, state that it was General Musharraf who requested Sharif to withdraw the Pakistani troops. With Sharif placing the onus of the Kargil attacks squarely on the army chief Pervez Musharraf, there was an atmosphere of uneasiness between the two. On October 12, 1999, General Musharraf staged a bloodless coup d'état, ousting Nawaz Sharif.

Benazir Bhutto, an opposition leader and former prime minister, called the Kargil War "Pakistan's greatest blunder". Many ex-officials of the military and the ISI (Pakistan's principal intelligence agency) also believed that "Kargil was a waste of time" and "could not have resulted in any advantage" on the larger issue of Kashmir. A retired Pakistani Army General, Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan, lambasted the war as "a disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy", adding that the plan was "flawed in terms of its conception, tactical planning and execution" that ended in "sacrificing so many soldiers." The Pakistani media criticized the whole plan and the eventual climbdown from the Kargil heights since there were no gains to show for the loss of lives and it only resulted in international condemnation.

Despite calls by many, no public commission of inquiry was set up in Pakistan to investigate the people responsible for initiating the conflict. The PML(N) published a white paper in 2006, which stated that Nawaz Sharif constituted an inquiry committee that recommended a court martial for General Pervez Musharraf, but Musharraf "stole the report" after toppling the government, to save himself. report also claims that India knew about the plan 11 months before its launch, enabling a complete victory for India on military, diplomatic and economic fronts. A statement in June, 2008 by a former army corps commander of Pakistan that Sharif "was never briefed by the army" on the Kargil attack, reignited the demand for a probe of the episode by legal and political groups.

Though the Kargil conflict had brought the Kashmir dispute into international focus – which was one of the aims of Pakistan – it had done so in negative circumstances that eroded its credibility, since the infiltration came just after a peace process between the two countries was underway. The sanctity of the LOC too received international recognition.

After the war, a few changes were made to the Pakistan army. In recognition of the Northern Light Infantry's performance in the war - which even drew praise from a retired Indian Lt. General - the regiment was incorporated into the regular army. The war showed that despite a tactically sound plan that had the element of surprise, little groundwork had been done to gauge the politico-diplomatic ramifications. like previous unsuccessful infiltrations attempts, such as Operation Gibraltar, which sparked the 1965 war, there was little coordination or information sharing among the branches of the Pakistan military. One U.S. Intelligence study is reported to have stated that Kargil was yet another example of Pakistan’s (lack of) grand strategy, repeating the follies of the previous wars.

INDIA vs PAKISTAN: AN ANALYSIS OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THEY WENT TO WAR (AND WHO WOULD WIN).

ANALYSIS -- Air Battle

Initial strike carried out by Indian Sukhoi 33s/30s, Harriers, MiG-27's, MiG-23's, MiG-21's and Jaguar's on forward Pakistani command posts, airfields, weapon storage facilities (namely nuclear weapons and IRBM) and communication relay stations escorted by MiG 29's, MiG-23's, Mirage 2000 and MiG 21-93's. While the Indian Naval Harriers and attack craft attack the port of Karachi in an attempt to close it to keep reinforcements from sympathetic Islamic countries coming in via sea.

In such a situation the Pakistani Air Force would have a major problem securing their airspace mainly due to the fact that their aircraft lack any real BVR (beyond visual range) capability or look-down shoot-down capability with only their F-16's having a look-down shoot-down capability but limited to only AIM-9 Sidewinders (Note:- although Pakistan is thought to have up to 500 AIM-7 Sparrows the only F-16A's capable of firing them are the F-16A Block 15 ADF used by the USAF). While their Mirage III's , V's , F-7's (MiG-21) and F-6's (MiG-19) have no look-down shoot-down capability and no BVR capability (Note:- some F-7's and Mirage III/V are to be upgraded, this will include new radar's and other avionics). While this gap may be filled in the near future through the FC-1 fighter while this would the PAF a look-down shoot-down capability that it presently lacks it would not be superior to the MiG-29, Mirage 2000 or the LCA. Thus at present this means that if Indian attack aircraft come in at low level Pakistani aircraft would have difficulty in detecting IAF aircraft and have no capability of engaging them at long range. While the Indian escort aircraft having a BVR capability with weapons including AA-10 Alamo's , AA-12 Adders and Super 530D AAM's would have the capability to engage PAF aircraft at medium/long range allowing IAF attack aircraft to operate under an umbrella of air cover, thus giving the IAF effective air superiority over much of the battle field. ( There have also been reports that the IAF have treated their front line aircraft such as the Jaguar, MiG-29, MiG-27 and Mirage 2000 with a stealth material said to reduce the RCS of aircraft by up to 70% and increases weight by up to 50kg, Aircraft & Aerospace Asia-Pacific, Feb. 1996 pg.20). Without a BVR capability Pakistan has to rely on a SAM system based primarily on short range SAM's like the Crotale and man portable SAM's like the Stinger and indigenous Anza, here to Pakistan lacks the modern SAM system that most armies now have. While the IAF will sustain losses to SAM's without a medium range, low-medium altitude SAM Pakistan will suffer serious losses to Indian deep strike missions.

Another weakness of the PAF is their apparent lack of dedicated attack aircraft with the Q-5 Fantan being their only dedicated strike aircraft , with the F-6's (MiG-19's) and Mirage III / V having to double as point defence fighters or interceptors. Secondly none of these aircraft have the capability to deliver PGM's only 'dumb' bomb's. The best strike aircraft possessed by the PAF is the F-16 but it is unlikely that Pakistan would use it's only advanced fighter in a strike role (Note: some reports suggest that Pakistan may have acquired PGM's from Denel). This limits the ability of the PAF to strike deep into India or hit targets with any great precision. This has been recognized by the Pakistani Government which attempted to fill the hole with attempted procurements of both the Su-27 and the Mirage 2000. Both procurement programs were abandoned after the respective companies pulled out after pressure by India as both companies are lobbying for a multi billion dollar training aircraft contract for the IAF and due to spiralling costs. Most recently the PAF has become involved in the FC-1 program , an aircraft which would be powered by the RD-93 , be equipped with an advanced look down - shoot down radar and have a g-limit of + 8g's (possibly 9+ for the PAF). In comparison the IAF recently acquired a PGM capability with the acquisition of the Rafael Litening laser designation pod for it's Jaguar's and Mirage 2000. While it is investigating the possibility of upgrading it's MiG-27 attack aircraft.

The IAF's superiority in aircraft with 135 modern combat aircraft (with 125 MiG 21 to be upgraded to the 21-93 standard, a projected 200 LCA to be delivered by 2010 and 40 Su-30MKI's with the option to manufacture 100) to the PAF's 38 (with a possible 150 FC-1's to be delivered within the next 10-15 years provided the program continues) would result in the IAF gaining almost complete air superiority over much of the battle field while limiting the ability of the PAF to strike deep into India.

It is also probable that Saudi Arabia may loan Pakistan an AWACS aircraft as Russia has previously done with the Tu-126 Moss. It is also probable that if Saudi Arabia were to send Pakistan an AWACS that they would also send along at least one squadron of F-15 interceptors as escort for the AWACS as well as to defend the AWACS in operations. While an AWACS if would be a massive improvement in Pakistan's air defence capability, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia would send more than 1 and without an airborne refuelling system and because of post flight maintenance the AWACS would probably be limited to 1 flight per day (with 12 hours on patrol). It is also possible that the United Arab Emirates would provide help in the form of Mirage 2000's. Another potential vulnerability of the Pakistani air force is its dependence on ground controlled intercept's, any attacks on control towers, command and control centres and the use of communications jamming could cause significant problems to airborne units which would find themselves isolated and due to the lack of effective radars unable to engage the enemy. This type of tactic would be particularly effective at night as it would allow Indian fighters to engage Pakistani units at long range at relatively low risk.

The PAF would be expected to lose about 40-50% of it's aircraft while the IAF would be expected to sustain losses of around 20% - 30% consisting of mainly MiG-21's and other ground attack aircraft which would be forced to get into close combat with the PAF aircraft as well as loses due to Pakistani SAM's such as the Crotale and the large number of hand held SAM's. The overall lack of modern aircraft seriously damage's the capability of the PAF in defending Pakistani airspace despite the high quality of it's pilots.

ANALYSIS -- Sea battle:

In naval matters India has a large advantage over the Pakistani Navy namely to it's aircraft carrier VIRAAT equipped with Harriers and Sea Kings along with a large number of surface vessels including six destroyers the latest of which are the Delhi Class DDG's which are among the worlds finest destroyers with 2 more planed, large numbers of frigates, corvettes including the Godavari Class (6) , Khukri Class (8) , Improved Krivak III Class (3 are on order and 3 are planed) and the Tarantul-I Class (11 of which are in service ; 5 are planed) and 17 submarines including nine Soviet Kilo class and four German SSK 209 Class, Type 1500. With a program to produce SLCM armed nuclear submarines and one aircraft carrier, along with this talks with Russia over the sale of Admiral Gorshkov continue, the current deal would see Admiral Gorshkov being equipped with a 14.5deg ski jump and MiG-29K's and possibly a navalised LCA, this would put the Indian Navy effectively into fifth place behind the US, UK, France and Russia.

In comparison the Pakistani Navy is based around 6 Type 21 Amazon class frigates bought from the RN after being forced to return 8 US frigates (Brooke class) due to sanctions. The Amazon class are veterans of the Falklands War where two were lost due to air attacks, displaying a major venerability to air attack. Their main armament comes in the form of four M.38 Exocet SSM (refitted with Harpoons) and LY 60N SAM's which have a range of 13km. With no aircraft carrier the fleet is left naked to air attack from INS Harriers , Sea Kings and IAF Jaguars all of which are equipped with Sea Eagle ASM's which have a range of 110 km. The Jaguars have also had their radar's upgraded to the Elta EL/M - 2032 which has been offered as an upgrade by Israel.

With the recent acquisition of the Ka-31AEW for operations of the carrier VIRAAT severally reduces the ability of the PAF Mirages configured to carry Exocet's to avoid detection in their strikes on the INS carrier group, as the Ka-31AEW's would give the INS Sea Harriers sufficient time to intercept or harass any attackers. As experience form the Falklands War has shown the Sea Harrier is more than a match for the Mirage III/V , where no Sea Harriers were lost to Mirages in ACM in return for the destruction of approximately 20 Mirages and Skyhawks. The range of the Exocet of 50km (or 70km for the latest versions) when launched at altitude means that attackers will have to approach to aprox. 45km from the carrier group an undertaking that would be hazardous under the best of circumstances.

The sharpest teeth of the PN is it's submarine arm which consists of 4 Daphne and 2 Augosta which are equipped with Harpoon SSM's, with 3 Agosta 90B class to be delivered by 2006. Although the number at sea at any one time would be limited to approximately 2 due to the fact that a minimum of 3 sub's are needed to maintain one at sea continuously ( one at sea, one undergoing repairs/servicing and a dock side trainer). Secondly the submarines are quite rapidly reaching the end of their service lives having been replaced by almost all services due to the rapid advances in sonar technology and the proliferation of the Kilo class which has gained the nickname "Black Hole" by NATO due to its low noise signature. While the PN submarine arm would be a major thorn in the side of the INS the lack of surface support limits their ability to strike the INS. The INS submarine arm by comparison would receive large amounts of support both from surface vessels and from air assets ( i.e. Tu-142M Bear, Il-38 and Dornier 228 ).

Most naval experts agree that while the INS will take loses to the PN will be beaten due to in-effective air cover for their surface combatants and limited SAM capability as well as the fact that it would be out-numbered 3-1. The result would be a closing of the port of Karachi and inability of Pakistani allies to resupply Pakistan via the sea. Rather than engage the Indian fleet the Pakistan Navy should concentrate on attempting to hold open its sea lanes, as any attack on the Indian fleet would probably result in failure.

ANALYSIS -- Ground campaign

With the ground campaign it neither country has a clear advantage that would allow it a sweeping victory (Gulf War style) but rather it would result in a bloody campaign that would last several weeks possibly months. Unless a successful Blitzkrieg style of campaign can be accomplished by one of the sides. While India has a 2-1 advantage in personal (1.1 million to 500,000) The Pakistani Army has shown to be quite effective when operating in defence and any Indian attack can expect to meet severe Pakistani opposition.

As always in a ground campaign the side which can gain air superiority and can maintain an advantage in armoured vehicles has a distinct advantage. With the Indian Air Force having the ability to gain air superiority over the battle field and the Army having 2000 T-72 M1 , 1800 Vickers MBT's and 700 T-55's, with the Arjuin MBT to go into production in the near future. Compared to the Pakistani Army's 2000 MBT's consisting of T-55, T-59, T-69, T-85II, T80 (Ukrainian), M-47 and M-48's ( Note: the Al Khalid MBT is currently undergoing testing and is expected to enter production soon). This gives an advantage of 4500 MBT to the 2000 Pakistani MBT. But consideration has to be given to the fact that not all the MBT's , soldiers or aircraft can be pressed to front line use as India would have to maintain a significant presence on it's border with China as an India at war with Pakistan would represent a tempting target to China. Although the acquisition of nuclear weapons should provide a credible deterrent to China. One advantage that India could use is it's massive transport helicopter arm with over 300 in service and 200 ALH's planned, this could allow India to place large numbers of troops behind enemy line's quickly gaining a significant advantage, on the other hand Pakistan does not have anywhere near this capability.

Short of outstanding tactics from one of the sides the ground campaign would result in a bloody and protracted war with neither side gaining any serious advantages. Although the lack of Pakistani reserves would begin to tell as well as the ability of the IAF to strike major targets in Pakistan this would result in the gaining of some ground by the Indian Army but the existence of the state of Pakistan would never be threatened nor would there be the possibility of the Pakistani Army gaining much Indian territory. The greatest danger is that in the struggle to gain ground one of the sides may resort to the use of nuclear weapons.

While Pakistan would seem to have the better missiles they are based on Chinese designs or are Chinese in origin leaving a question mark over their accuracy and reliability. As recent launches have shown Chinese satellite launch vehicles are generally unreliable at best, while their ICBM's and IRBM's would be more reliable there is still a question mark over them, although they still provide a very credible nuclear threat to India but lack the accuracy to present any real conventional threat. On the other hand the Indian Prithvi SRBM which is capable of caring a 1 tone warhead over 250km has been reported to have attained an CEP of 10m in some tests through the use of a warhead similar to that of the RA-DAG warhead used by the Pershing II (Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, April/May 1994, pg 20). While the Agni missile system said to have a range of 2500km is said to be just months away from production should the need arise, along with recent advances in Indian rocketry that have made the possibility of an Indian ICBM a reality. The recent acquisition of the S-300 SAM with a range in excess of 200km and a secondary ABM capability also provides India with basic ABM capability. Also the recent tests by India of sub kiloton nuclear weapons which are primarily used as battle field weapons suggests that Indian strategist's may have envisioned their use in battle.

Result.

In the final analysis the PAF and the Pakistani Naval Service would have had much of their offensive capabilities destroyed, while the Pakistani Army although better off would have lost most of it's top divisions , something that would have also occurred with the Indian Army. While the INS and IAF would be in a significantly better position than their Pakistani counterparts, the IAF would have to engage in a major rebuilding to address the losses that it would suffer to it's fleet mainly it's older attack fighters in their attacks on Pakistani targets and in maintaining air superiority, while the INS would have to address losses that would incur in it's engagements with the PNS. While Pakistan's push to become a regional superpower would have been severely curtailed. While the economies of both countries but in particular Pakistan would be severally damaged..

AGNI-2 MISSILE

Agni is a Sanskrit/Hindi word meaning Fire, given that it is a strategic ballistic missile. The Agni missile family is envisaged to be the mainstay of the Indian missile-based strategic nuclear deterrence. The Agni-II is a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) with two solid fuel stages and a Post Boost Vehicle (PBV) integrated into the missile's Re-entry Vehicle (RV). The Agni's manoeuvring RV is made of a carbon-carbon composite material that is light and able to sustain high thermal stresses of re-entry, in a variety of trajectories. The Agni-IIIA is a more advanced version of Agni-II, albeit with more sophisticated and lighter materials, yielding a better range and operating regime. The first test of Agni-IIIA is expected in the year 2009.

During the 1990s, India's security situation gradually worsened with security challenges from China, blatant Chinese nuclear and missiles proliferation to Pakistan, and mutual proliferation between Pakistan and North Korea. The strategic redline was crossed in 1998 when Pakistan tested the North-Korean supplied nuclear capable Ghauri (North Korean No-Dong) missile, that could threaten India's heartland. The international complicity in allowing nuclear proliferation by proxy into the hands of Pakistan and ability to deliver it over long ranges, obtained by trading in black-market North Korean No-Dong missiles, in return for Pakistani nuclear design and enrichment equipment by the Walmart of nuclear and missile black-market run by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan and the Pakistani Military. This and other international security developments forced India to go fully nuclear, resulting in the Pokhran-II (POK-II) nuclear test series and its weaponization by developing the Agni family of ballistic missiles that could deliver a variety of payloads over long ranges.

Quick deployment of the Agni-II was possible, by building on the earlier Agni-TD program that provided proven critical technologies and designs required for long range ballistic missiles. Thus when the decision was made to build the Agni weapon system, some quick optimization and ruggedization was done to the basic '1980 vintage' design, including a solid fuelled second stage. Further the solid fuel chemistry, RV and avionics were brought up to state-of-the-art levels. As the Pokhran-II (PoK-II) nuclear test proved a family of more powerful and lighter nuclear weapons, the 200 KT thermonuclear weapon is far lighter compared to 1000 kg earlier budgeted for the 200 KT boosted nuclear weapon. Thus a high yield weapon configuration now assumes a payload of 500 kg, including weapon and RV. However, in the interest of rapid development the basic design that was earlier developed continued to be used and keeping the future option open, for more optimized missile design and lighter payload. The Agni-II missile will be used by 555th Missile Group of the Indian Army.

Description:

The Agni-II was first tested on 11 April 1999 at 9:47 a.m. IST (Indian Standard Time), from a converted rail carriage, with a carriage roof that slides open to allow the missile to be raised to the vertical for launch by two large hydraulic pistons. The launch process is controlled from a separate railcar. The missile was launched from the IC-4 pad at Wheeler Island, Balasore. Splash down was 2000 - 2100 km. down range in the Bay of Bengal, on a trajectory designed to simulate a range of 2800 - 3000 km. The Agni-II missile can also be launched from a road TEL vehicle, as demonstrated in the second test flight on 17 January 2001, at 10:01 a.m. IST (Indian Standard Time) to a range of 2100 km. This missile has a theoretical maximum range of some 3000 km with a 1000 kg payload (conventional or strategic).

Tested to range of over 2000 km, the Agni-II has an all-solid propellant system. After the January 17th test, the missile was cleared for production and it is possible that a production capacity (under-utilised at present) exists for 12 Agni-II missiles per year. On the January 17th test, the missile was alleged to have covered a range of over 2100 km with a 700 kg warhead. The Agni-II is designed to be launched from a rail-mobile launcher,it is also available in road-mobile configuration. This lends flexibility and reduces vulnerability to first strike.

The Agni-II is always be in a ready-to-fire mode and can be launched within 15 minutes as compared to almost half a day of preparation for the previous generation Agni-TD. In May 2001, and again in July 2001, the then-incumbent Defence Minister Jaswant Singh informed the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) that the Agni-II missile is operational, limited production had begun and induction being planned during 2001-2002. On 14 March 2002, Defence Minister George Fernandes informed Indian Parliament that the Agni-II has entered the production phase and is under induction. Agni-II is made by BDL in Hyderabad, with a production capacity of 18 missiles/year and costs about Rs.35 crore [34] for each missile.

Propulsion:

First Stage: The Agni-II's first stage is largely similar to that of Agni-TD's first stage. However the Agni-II booster is believed to employ more energetic fuel; Booster ISP of 269 (vacuum) and 237 (sea-level). It has a propellant mass of about 9 tons and estimated mass fraction of 0.865.

Second Stage: The Agni-II's second stage weighs ~4200 kg and uses solid fuel propellant. Its case is presumably made of the same material, high-strength 15CDV6 steel, as the booster stage for ease of manufacturing. This solid propellant stage has flex nozzles for thrust vectoring, for precise trajectory control. Unlike the Agni-TD, the solid fuel second stage does not require retro motors for proper stage separation. It uses a vented inter-stage.

Manoeuvring Re-Entry Vehicle: Agni RV-Mk.2

The 1980-vintage RV was reportedly designed to be able to carry a BARC-developed, boosted nuclear weapon of 200 KT yield weighing 1000 kg, also of 1980 vintage design. After making room for new and lighter Indian thermonuclear weapon payload, of 1995 vintage design, the MRV has room for about 200 kg (estimated) liquid fuel in pressurized vessels. Although for velocity correction, approximately 50 to 80 kg is estimated to be sufficient. At least one MRV variant type uses a set of solid fuelled cartridges for velocity trimming. The RV is reported to have an attitude control system and aerodynamic manoeuvre fins, presumably to make missile defense more difficult. Unconfirmed reports suggest that an improved optical or radar terminal phase correlation system has been developed to provide accuracy of around 40 meters CEP, although later reports have suggested that the accuracy was around 100 to 200 meters CEP. The RV largely inherits the basic shape, design and technology of the earlier Mk.1 RV of the Agni-TD.

Agni is unlike long-range missiles developed by western missiles where the RV is a passive ballistic load, whose accuracy depends on the launching vehicle's exact insertion into the sub-orbital trajectory. A large inaccuracy associated with the first generation RV, involved spinning the RV for greater stability during re-entry. Second generation western missiles were mostly MIRV (Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle) and the accuracy was greatly improved by the payload bus with HAM velocity correction package for more accurate sub-orbit insertion. It also allowed individual MIRV payloads to impart different velocities, so that each can be independently targeted to a different target, albeit in nearby vicinity of each other. As before the RV continued to be passive and purely ballistic. The Agni-RV Mk.2 is more advanced than the western RVs, because it embodies proposition, navigation and control all the way to the target. The RV re-enters at an altitude of 100 km, at a shallow angle, with a gliding trajectory [38]. However it does not carry a MIRV payload.

Key Features of the Agni-RV Mk.2

1. The manoeuvring fins that allows it to;
   • Execute a non-ballistic trajectory to make interception more difficult.
   • Overcome any perturbation due to high altitude atmospheric disturbance.
   • Enable use of body lift at hypersonic velocity to glide the missile over longer ranges, thus reducing the thermal and physical stress at a modified Max-Q point.
   • Trajectory error to be determined late into the fight and corrected using aerodynamic force during re-entry.
   • Terminal manoeuvre dive for a more acute target interdiction angle improving CEP.
   • Support a wider range of payload weight and configuration.
2. Integrated velocity correction package for greater precision; has a set of solid fuelled cartridge(s) that are used to correct impulse variances of solid fuelled stages and subtle launch trajectory perturbation.
3. Integrated High Altitude Motor (HAM) which is liquid fuelled. Depending on the actual payload configuration, the HAM fuel load can be increased to trade range for a lighter and more compact weapon.
4. Larger internal volume allows more sophisticated ABM (anti-ballistic missile) counter-measures.

Avionics, Navigation and Control

The Agni family of missiles uses a strap-down INS system for flight control and navigation. Necessary inertial sensors were indigenously developed for the purpose, including laser rate gyros.

Agni-II introduced a new concept in missile control system by adopting MIL-STD-1553 databus for all on-board communication and control device interconnection --> mainly INS system, Flight Control Computer, actuators and sensors [42]. It is the standard that is adopted in new civilian & military aircraft (circuit routing and device mounting) and all the software in the Agni-II has been designed around this bus. DRDO sources claim that this reduces the number of connections and also makes the missile more rugged. However, some missile analysts feel that a standard databus may not be the best path to follow. It is said that a customized databus is better because in a standard databus, one tends to use off-the-shelf electronic devices whose performance may not be optimal. However most new missiles are moving towards digital buses using commercial off-the-shelf technology and which enables affordable sub-system replacement.

Accuracy

The Agni-II's navigation and aiming uses an advanced ground based beacon system using a TDOA (Time Delay Of Arrival) technique, similar to a GPS system, that constantly provides missile flight position and velocity updates and has been proven in test flights. The TDOA system reportedly improved the accuracy by three times. India has demonstrated a measure of mastery in navigation sensors and flight control through its space program. The placement accuracy in GTO (involving powered flight of 1000 seconds much of it in sub-G or gravity free environment) is far more complicated and delicate than that of the sub-orbital trajectory of an IRBM. Thus the GSLV-D2 and F01 GTO Apogee accuracy of 1965 PPM and 361 PPM respectively that compares with Agni-II's 40 meter CEP at IRBM ranges with 13 PPM accuracy.

It is worthwhile to note that INS error differs for a ballistic missile versus an aircraft. Ballistic missile accuracy is only dependent on the INS accuracy up to the point when rocket fuel is expended (100 seconds for Agni-II) and it exits the atmosphere (> 90 km altitude), after that the trajectory is purely ballistic that is predetermined and easily computed. INS in a combat aircraft requires continuous operation of IMU and navigation computer throughout the flight during which the error keeps building as IMU sensors drift. A ballistic missile that can update its position and velocity from auxiliary means, can completely eliminate the built up error from INS and continue flight at a precise predetermined path, if necessary correcting the launch error by using:

1. Small velocity correction thruster package and/or
2. Aerodynamic manoeuvring during re-entry (this requires active RV configuration with integrated INS and control system).

The Agni-II missile reportedly makes use of both the above techniques. The Agni-II exits atmosphere and expends the second stage at an altitude of 120 km and at a distance of about 150 km. This allows the ground based TDOA system to operate well within Indian Territory and at close range (i.e. robustness against Electronic Warfare interference). The missile maintains LOS (line of sight) well beyond apogee. The overall accuracy is the cumulated sum of:

1. Accuracy of determining geographic coordinate of target and launcher.
2. Accuracy of hitting the designated coordinates that is determined by missile's navigation and control system.

Launching the Agni from a surveyed site is one aspect of item 1 above. The sub-meter target coordinates, using national surveillance assets, (aerospace, sensors, etc) would largely address the accuracy of target coordinate designation. A long-range ballistic missile (passive RV) targeting error is typically spread in a highly elliptic pattern. The CEP is thus adversely biased by a wide error spread in a longitudinal axis (due to shallow incidence angle). The Agni's active manoeuvring RV with onboard IMU (INS) and control system can perform terminal manoeuvre to correct errors and make a more accurate top attack profile using greater incidence angle significantly reducing the longitudinal spread and overall CEP.

Range

The Bharat_Rakshak Agni page » MISSILE ARMOURY » AGNI - STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE has extensive data and analysis that uses public domain data and ballistic calculations to show that the range is greatly influenced by use or non-use of thrusters on the RV (required for velocity trimming) for propulsion as a HAM (High Altitude Motor). There seems to be room in the RV for about ~200 kg fuel (solid or liquid) after allowing for a long but lightweight TN weapon. This RV integrated HAM is referred to as the half stage after the two solid fuelled stages. This stage provides a disproportional increase in range for a lighter RV payload. Thus development of lightweight nuclear weapons is paramount to the missile's range.

When the Agni-II was first launched, then Defence Minister George Fernandes indicated that the maximum range of the Agni-II was 3000 km. Since then, ranges from 2000 km to 2500 km have been bandied about while Dr. Kalam, at Aero India '98, stated that Agni-II had a maximum range of 3,700 km! The range of 2000 km can be excluded, as the system has been tested to greater range in both 1999 and 2001. Given the test to 2300 km in 1999 and 2100 km in 2001, with an apparently lighter payload, would indicate that a variation in trajectory was used and it may be possible to extrapolate some more accurate estimates of Agni-II's maximum range.

It would appear that Agni-II has a theoretical ability to hit a target 3000 km away with a 1000 kg overall payload – (a 250 kg RV's deadweight and a 750 kg warhead). It is suggested that a 200 kiloton 'boosted fission' warhead was earlier developed for the Agni system when it was on the drawing board in the late 80s, however after the Pokhran-II series of nuclear test in May 1998, the 200 KT boosted fission design has clearly given way to a 200 - 300 KT two stage thermonuclear design that is expected to be much lighter. From the tables at Effect of payload and stage configuration on Agni-II range, one can see that a number of permutations and combinations are available to DRDO based on the existing Agni-II design and Indian propulsion technology. Range changes can be made by either varying the payload or by altering the engine configuration.

Given the available data, it is therefore clear that Agni-II has a maximum range of somewhere in excess of 3000 km, and possibly as high as 3500 km with a 1000 kg payload. Greater range with a lighter payload however requires the RV to be qualified for higher re-entry velocity and corresponding Max-Q for thermal stress.

Conclusion

As the backbone of the Indian land-based nuclear deterrent, the real significance of the Agni-II is the fact that it is both road and rail mobile. This is an indication of India's desire not to put its missiles into vulnerable silos. The mobility of the Agni-II, combined with the sheer physical size of India renders the mobile IRBM a very secure and survivable delivery system. Its range of strategic weapons payload and good accuracy make this strategic weapon useful for counter value as well as first strike role.

SI electricity units

edit SI electromagnetism units
Symbol [citation needed]	Name of Quantity	Derived Units	Unit	Base Units
I	Magnitude of current	ampere (SI base unit)	A	A = W/V = C/s
q	Electric charge, Quantity of electricity	coulomb	C	A·s
U	Potential difference or Electromotive force	volt	V	J/C = kg·m2·s−3·A−1
R, Z, X	Resistance, Impedance, Reactance	ohm	Ω	V/A = kg·m2·s−3·A−2
ρ	Resistivity	ohm metre	Ω·m	kg·m3·s−3·A−2
P	Power, Electrical	watt	W	V·A = kg·m2·s−3
C	Capacitance	farad	F	C/V = kg−1·m−2·A2·s4
	Elastance	reciprocal farad	F−1	V/C = kg·m2·A−2·s−4
ε	Permittivity	farad per metre	F/m	kg−1·m−3·A2·s4
χe	Electric susceptibility	(dimensionless)	-	-
G, Y, B	Conductance, Admittance, Susceptance	siemens	S	Ω−1 = kg−1·m−2·s3·A2
σ	Conductivity	siemens per metre	S/m	kg−1·m−3·s3·A2
H	Magnetic field, magnetic field intensity	ampere per metre	A/m	A·m−1
Φm	Magnetic flux	weber	Wb	V·s = kg·m2·s−2·A−1
B	Magnetic flux density, magnetic induction, magnetic field strength	tesla	T	Wb/m2 = kg·s−2·A−1 = N·A−1·m−1
	Reluctance	ampere-turn per weber	A/Wb	kg−1·m−2·s2·A2
L	Inductance	henry	H	Wb/A = V·s/A = kg·m2·s−2·A−2
μ	Permeability	henry per metre	H/m	kg·m·s−2·A−2
χm	Magnetic susceptibility	(dimensionless)	-	-