Sunday, December 21, 2008

INDIA vs PAKISTAN: AN ANALYSIS OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THEY WENT TO WAR (AND WHO WOULD WIN).

ANALYSIS -- Air Battle

Initial strike carried out by Indian Sukhoi 33s/30s, Harriers, MiG-27's, MiG-23's, MiG-21's and Jaguar's on forward Pakistani command posts, airfields, weapon storage facilities (namely nuclear weapons and IRBM) and communication relay stations escorted by MiG 29's, MiG-23's, Mirage 2000 and MiG 21-93's. While the Indian Naval Harriers and attack craft attack the port of Karachi in an attempt to close it to keep reinforcements from sympathetic Islamic countries coming in via sea.

In such a situation the Pakistani Air Force would have a major problem securing their airspace mainly due to the fact that their aircraft lack any real BVR (beyond visual range) capability or look-down shoot-down capability with only their F-16's having a look-down shoot-down capability but limited to only AIM-9 Sidewinders (Note:- although Pakistan is thought to have up to 500 AIM-7 Sparrows the only F-16A's capable of firing them are the F-16A Block 15 ADF used by the USAF). While their Mirage III's , V's , F-7's (MiG-21) and F-6's (MiG-19) have no look-down shoot-down capability and no BVR capability (Note:- some F-7's and Mirage III/V are to be upgraded, this will include new radar's and other avionics). While this gap may be filled in the near future through the FC-1 fighter while this would the PAF a look-down shoot-down capability that it presently lacks it would not be superior to the MiG-29, Mirage 2000 or the LCA. Thus at present this means that if Indian attack aircraft come in at low level Pakistani aircraft would have difficulty in detecting IAF aircraft and have no capability of engaging them at long range. While the Indian escort aircraft having a BVR capability with weapons including AA-10 Alamo's , AA-12 Adders and Super 530D AAM's would have the capability to engage PAF aircraft at medium/long range allowing IAF attack aircraft to operate under an umbrella of air cover, thus giving the IAF effective air superiority over much of the battle field. ( There have also been reports that the IAF have treated their front line aircraft such as the Jaguar, MiG-29, MiG-27 and Mirage 2000 with a stealth material said to reduce the RCS of aircraft by up to 70% and increases weight by up to 50kg, Aircraft & Aerospace Asia-Pacific, Feb. 1996 pg.20). Without a BVR capability Pakistan has to rely on a SAM system based primarily on short range SAM's like the Crotale and man portable SAM's like the Stinger and indigenous Anza, here to Pakistan lacks the modern SAM system that most armies now have. While the IAF will sustain losses to SAM's without a medium range, low-medium altitude SAM Pakistan will suffer serious losses to Indian deep strike missions.

Another weakness of the PAF is their apparent lack of dedicated attack aircraft with the Q-5 Fantan being their only dedicated strike aircraft , with the F-6's (MiG-19's) and Mirage III / V having to double as point defence fighters or interceptors. Secondly none of these aircraft have the capability to deliver PGM's only 'dumb' bomb's. The best strike aircraft possessed by the PAF is the F-16 but it is unlikely that Pakistan would use it's only advanced fighter in a strike role (Note: some reports suggest that Pakistan may have acquired PGM's from Denel). This limits the ability of the PAF to strike deep into India or hit targets with any great precision. This has been recognized by the Pakistani Government which attempted to fill the hole with attempted procurements of both the Su-27 and the Mirage 2000. Both procurement programs were abandoned after the respective companies pulled out after pressure by India as both companies are lobbying for a multi billion dollar training aircraft contract for the IAF and due to spiralling costs. Most recently the PAF has become involved in the FC-1 program , an aircraft which would be powered by the RD-93 , be equipped with an advanced look down - shoot down radar and have a g-limit of + 8g's (possibly 9+ for the PAF). In comparison the IAF recently acquired a PGM capability with the acquisition of the Rafael Litening laser designation pod for it's Jaguar's and Mirage 2000. While it is investigating the possibility of upgrading it's MiG-27 attack aircraft.

The IAF's superiority in aircraft with 135 modern combat aircraft (with 125 MiG 21 to be upgraded to the 21-93 standard, a projected 200 LCA to be delivered by 2010 and 40 Su-30MKI's with the option to manufacture 100) to the PAF's 38 (with a possible 150 FC-1's to be delivered within the next 10-15 years provided the program continues) would result in the IAF gaining almost complete air superiority over much of the battle field while limiting the ability of the PAF to strike deep into India.

It is also probable that Saudi Arabia may loan Pakistan an AWACS aircraft as Russia has previously done with the Tu-126 Moss. It is also probable that if Saudi Arabia were to send Pakistan an AWACS that they would also send along at least one squadron of F-15 interceptors as escort for the AWACS as well as to defend the AWACS in operations. While an AWACS if would be a massive improvement in Pakistan's air defence capability, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia would send more than 1 and without an airborne refuelling system and because of post flight maintenance the AWACS would probably be limited to 1 flight per day (with 12 hours on patrol). It is also possible that the United Arab Emirates would provide help in the form of Mirage 2000's. Another potential vulnerability of the Pakistani air force is its dependence on ground controlled intercept's, any attacks on control towers, command and control centres and the use of communications jamming could cause significant problems to airborne units which would find themselves isolated and due to the lack of effective radars unable to engage the enemy. This type of tactic would be particularly effective at night as it would allow Indian fighters to engage Pakistani units at long range at relatively low risk.

The PAF would be expected to lose about 40-50% of it's aircraft while the IAF would be expected to sustain losses of around 20% - 30% consisting of mainly MiG-21's and other ground attack aircraft which would be forced to get into close combat with the PAF aircraft as well as loses due to Pakistani SAM's such as the Crotale and the large number of hand held SAM's. The overall lack of modern aircraft seriously damage's the capability of the PAF in defending Pakistani airspace despite the high quality of it's pilots.


ANALYSIS -- Sea battle:

In naval matters India has a large advantage over the Pakistani Navy namely to it's aircraft carrier VIRAAT equipped with Harriers and Sea Kings along with a large number of surface vessels including six destroyers the latest of which are the Delhi Class DDG's which are among the worlds finest destroyers with 2 more planed, large numbers of frigates, corvettes including the Godavari Class (6) , Khukri Class (8) , Improved Krivak III Class (3 are on order and 3 are planed) and the Tarantul-I Class (11 of which are in service ; 5 are planed) and 17 submarines including nine Soviet Kilo class and four German SSK 209 Class, Type 1500. With a program to produce SLCM armed nuclear submarines and one aircraft carrier, along with this talks with Russia over the sale of Admiral Gorshkov continue, the current deal would see Admiral Gorshkov being equipped with a 14.5deg ski jump and MiG-29K's and possibly a navalised LCA, this would put the Indian Navy effectively into fifth place behind the US, UK, France and Russia.

In comparison the Pakistani Navy is based around 6 Type 21 Amazon class frigates bought from the RN after being forced to return 8 US frigates (Brooke class) due to sanctions. The Amazon class are veterans of the Falklands War where two were lost due to air attacks, displaying a major venerability to air attack. Their main armament comes in the form of four M.38 Exocet SSM (refitted with Harpoons) and LY 60N SAM's which have a range of 13km. With no aircraft carrier the fleet is left naked to air attack from INS Harriers , Sea Kings and IAF Jaguars all of which are equipped with Sea Eagle ASM's which have a range of 110 km. The Jaguars have also had their radar's upgraded to the Elta EL/M - 2032 which has been offered as an upgrade by Israel.

With the recent acquisition of the Ka-31AEW for operations of the carrier VIRAAT severally reduces the ability of the PAF Mirages configured to carry Exocet's to avoid detection in their strikes on the INS carrier group, as the Ka-31AEW's would give the INS Sea Harriers sufficient time to intercept or harass any attackers. As experience form the Falklands War has shown the Sea Harrier is more than a match for the Mirage III/V , where no Sea Harriers were lost to Mirages in ACM in return for the destruction of approximately 20 Mirages and Skyhawks. The range of the Exocet of 50km (or 70km for the latest versions) when launched at altitude means that attackers will have to approach to aprox. 45km from the carrier group an undertaking that would be hazardous under the best of circumstances.

The sharpest teeth of the PN is it's submarine arm which consists of 4 Daphne and 2 Augosta which are equipped with Harpoon SSM's, with 3 Agosta 90B class to be delivered by 2006. Although the number at sea at any one time would be limited to approximately 2 due to the fact that a minimum of 3 sub's are needed to maintain one at sea continuously ( one at sea, one undergoing repairs/servicing and a dock side trainer). Secondly the submarines are quite rapidly reaching the end of their service lives having been replaced by almost all services due to the rapid advances in sonar technology and the proliferation of the Kilo class which has gained the nickname "Black Hole" by NATO due to its low noise signature. While the PN submarine arm would be a major thorn in the side of the INS the lack of surface support limits their ability to strike the INS. The INS submarine arm by comparison would receive large amounts of support both from surface vessels and from air assets ( i.e. Tu-142M Bear, Il-38 and Dornier 228 ).

Most naval experts agree that while the INS will take loses to the PN will be beaten due to in-effective air cover for their surface combatants and limited SAM capability as well as the fact that it would be out-numbered 3-1. The result would be a closing of the port of Karachi and inability of Pakistani allies to resupply Pakistan via the sea. Rather than engage the Indian fleet the Pakistan Navy should concentrate on attempting to hold open its sea lanes, as any attack on the Indian fleet would probably result in failure.

ANALYSIS -- Ground campaign

With the ground campaign it neither country has a clear advantage that would allow it a sweeping victory (Gulf War style) but rather it would result in a bloody campaign that would last several weeks possibly months. Unless a successful Blitzkrieg style of campaign can be accomplished by one of the sides. While India has a 2-1 advantage in personal (1.1 million to 500,000) The Pakistani Army has shown to be quite effective when operating in defence and any Indian attack can expect to meet severe Pakistani opposition.

As always in a ground campaign the side which can gain air superiority and can maintain an advantage in armoured vehicles has a distinct advantage. With the Indian Air Force having the ability to gain air superiority over the battle field and the Army having 2000 T-72 M1 , 1800 Vickers MBT's and 700 T-55's, with the Arjuin MBT to go into production in the near future. Compared to the Pakistani Army's 2000 MBT's consisting of T-55, T-59, T-69, T-85II, T80 (Ukrainian), M-47 and M-48's ( Note: the Al Khalid MBT is currently undergoing testing and is expected to enter production soon). This gives an advantage of 4500 MBT to the 2000 Pakistani MBT. But consideration has to be given to the fact that not all the MBT's , soldiers or aircraft can be pressed to front line use as India would have to maintain a significant presence on it's border with China as an India at war with Pakistan would represent a tempting target to China. Although the acquisition of nuclear weapons should provide a credible deterrent to China. One advantage that India could use is it's massive transport helicopter arm with over 300 in service and 200 ALH's planned, this could allow India to place large numbers of troops behind enemy line's quickly gaining a significant advantage, on the other hand Pakistan does not have anywhere near this capability.

Short of outstanding tactics from one of the sides the ground campaign would result in a bloody and protracted war with neither side gaining any serious advantages. Although the lack of Pakistani reserves would begin to tell as well as the ability of the IAF to strike major targets in Pakistan this would result in the gaining of some ground by the Indian Army but the existence of the state of Pakistan would never be threatened nor would there be the possibility of the Pakistani Army gaining much Indian territory. The greatest danger is that in the struggle to gain ground one of the sides may resort to the use of nuclear weapons.

While Pakistan would seem to have the better missiles they are based on Chinese designs or are Chinese in origin leaving a question mark over their accuracy and reliability. As recent launches have shown Chinese satellite launch vehicles are generally unreliable at best, while their ICBM's and IRBM's would be more reliable there is still a question mark over them, although they still provide a very credible nuclear threat to India but lack the accuracy to present any real conventional threat. On the other hand the Indian Prithvi SRBM which is capable of caring a 1 tone warhead over 250km has been reported to have attained an CEP of 10m in some tests through the use of a warhead similar to that of the RA-DAG warhead used by the Pershing II (Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, April/May 1994, pg 20). While the Agni missile system said to have a range of 2500km is said to be just months away from production should the need arise, along with recent advances in Indian rocketry that have made the possibility of an Indian ICBM a reality. The recent acquisition of the S-300 SAM with a range in excess of 200km and a secondary ABM capability also provides India with basic ABM capability. Also the recent tests by India of sub kiloton nuclear weapons which are primarily used as battle field weapons suggests that Indian strategist's may have envisioned their use in battle.


Result.

In the final analysis the PAF and the Pakistani Naval Service would have had much of their offensive capabilities destroyed, while the Pakistani Army although better off would have lost most of it's top divisions , something that would have also occurred with the Indian Army. While the INS and IAF would be in a significantly better position than their Pakistani counterparts, the IAF would have to engage in a major rebuilding to address the losses that it would suffer to it's fleet mainly it's older attack fighters in their attacks on Pakistani targets and in maintaining air superiority, while the INS would have to address losses that would incur in it's engagements with the PNS. While Pakistan's push to become a regional superpower would have been severely curtailed. While the economies of both countries but in particular Pakistan would be severally damaged..

Saturday, December 20, 2008

AGNI-2 MISSILE


Agni is a Sanskrit/Hindi word meaning Fire, given that it is a strategic ballistic missile. The Agni missile family is envisaged to be the mainstay of the Indian missile-based strategic nuclear deterrence. The Agni-II is a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) with two solid fuel stages and a Post Boost Vehicle (PBV) integrated into the missile's Re-entry Vehicle (RV). The Agni's manoeuvring RV is made of a carbon-carbon composite material that is light and able to sustain high thermal stresses of re-entry, in a variety of trajectories. The Agni-IIIA is a more advanced version of Agni-II, albeit with more sophisticated and lighter materials, yielding a better range and operating regime. The first test of Agni-IIIA is expected in the year 2009.

During the 1990s, India's security situation gradually worsened with security challenges from China, blatant Chinese nuclear and missiles proliferation to Pakistan, and mutual proliferation between Pakistan and North Korea. The strategic redline was crossed in 1998 when Pakistan tested the North-Korean supplied nuclear capable Ghauri (North Korean No-Dong) missile, that could threaten India's heartland. The international complicity in allowing nuclear proliferation by proxy into the hands of Pakistan and ability to deliver it over long ranges, obtained by trading in black-market North Korean No-Dong missiles, in return for Pakistani nuclear design and enrichment equipment by the Walmart of nuclear and missile black-market run by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan and the Pakistani Military. This and other international security developments forced India to go fully nuclear, resulting in the Pokhran-II (POK-II) nuclear test series and its weaponization by developing the Agni family of ballistic missiles that could deliver a variety of payloads over long ranges.

Quick deployment of the Agni-II was possible, by building on the earlier Agni-TD program that provided proven critical technologies and designs required for long range ballistic missiles. Thus when the decision was made to build the Agni weapon system, some quick optimization and ruggedization was done to the basic '1980 vintage' design, including a solid fuelled second stage. Further the solid fuel chemistry, RV and avionics were brought up to state-of-the-art levels. As the Pokhran-II (PoK-II) nuclear test proved a family of more powerful and lighter nuclear weapons, the 200 KT thermonuclear weapon is far lighter compared to 1000 kg earlier budgeted for the 200 KT boosted nuclear weapon. Thus a high yield weapon configuration now assumes a payload of 500 kg, including weapon and RV. However, in the interest of rapid development the basic design that was earlier developed continued to be used and keeping the future option open, for more optimized missile design and lighter payload. The Agni-II missile will be used by 555th Missile Group of the Indian Army.

Description:

The Agni-II was first tested on 11 April 1999 at 9:47 a.m. IST (Indian Standard Time), from a converted rail carriage, with a carriage roof that slides open to allow the missile to be raised to the vertical for launch by two large hydraulic pistons. The launch process is controlled from a separate railcar. The missile was launched from the IC-4 pad at Wheeler Island, Balasore. Splash down was 2000 - 2100 km. down range in the Bay of Bengal, on a trajectory designed to simulate a range of 2800 - 3000 km. The Agni-II missile can also be launched from a road TEL vehicle, as demonstrated in the second test flight on 17 January 2001, at 10:01 a.m. IST (Indian Standard Time) to a range of 2100 km. This missile has a theoretical maximum range of some 3000 km with a 1000 kg payload (conventional or strategic).

Tested to range of over 2000 km, the Agni-II has an all-solid propellant system. After the January 17th test, the missile was cleared for production and it is possible that a production capacity (under-utilised at present) exists for 12 Agni-II missiles per year. On the January 17th test, the missile was alleged to have covered a range of over 2100 km with a 700 kg warhead. The Agni-II is designed to be launched from a rail-mobile launcher,it is also available in road-mobile configuration. This lends flexibility and reduces vulnerability to first strike.

The Agni-II is always be in a ready-to-fire mode and can be launched within 15 minutes as compared to almost half a day of preparation for the previous generation Agni-TD. In May 2001, and again in July 2001, the then-incumbent Defence Minister Jaswant Singh informed the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) that the Agni-II missile is operational, limited production had begun and induction being planned during 2001-2002. On 14 March 2002, Defence Minister George Fernandes informed Indian Parliament that the Agni-II has entered the production phase and is under induction. Agni-II is made by BDL in Hyderabad, with a production capacity of 18 missiles/year and costs about Rs.35 crore [34] for each missile.

Propulsion:

First Stage: The Agni-II's first stage is largely similar to that of Agni-TD's first stage. However the Agni-II booster is believed to employ more energetic fuel; Booster ISP of 269 (vacuum) and 237 (sea-level). It has a propellant mass of about 9 tons and estimated mass fraction of 0.865.

Second Stage: The Agni-II's second stage weighs ~4200 kg and uses solid fuel propellant. Its case is presumably made of the same material, high-strength 15CDV6 steel, as the booster stage for ease of manufacturing. This solid propellant stage has flex nozzles for thrust vectoring, for precise trajectory control. Unlike the Agni-TD, the solid fuel second stage does not require retro motors for proper stage separation. It uses a vented inter-stage.

Manoeuvring Re-Entry Vehicle: Agni RV-Mk.2

The 1980-vintage RV was reportedly designed to be able to carry a BARC-developed, boosted nuclear weapon of 200 KT yield weighing 1000 kg, also of 1980 vintage design. After making room for new and lighter Indian thermonuclear weapon payload, of 1995 vintage design, the MRV has room for about 200 kg (estimated) liquid fuel in pressurized vessels. Although for velocity correction, approximately 50 to 80 kg is estimated to be sufficient. At least one MRV variant type uses a set of solid fuelled cartridges for velocity trimming. The RV is reported to have an attitude control system and aerodynamic manoeuvre fins, presumably to make missile defense more difficult. Unconfirmed reports suggest that an improved optical or radar terminal phase correlation system has been developed to provide accuracy of around 40 meters CEP, although later reports have suggested that the accuracy was around 100 to 200 meters CEP. The RV largely inherits the basic shape, design and technology of the earlier Mk.1 RV of the Agni-TD.

Agni is unlike long-range missiles developed by western missiles where the RV is a passive ballistic load, whose accuracy depends on the launching vehicle's exact insertion into the sub-orbital trajectory. A large inaccuracy associated with the first generation RV, involved spinning the RV for greater stability during re-entry. Second generation western missiles were mostly MIRV (Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle) and the accuracy was greatly improved by the payload bus with HAM velocity correction package for more accurate sub-orbit insertion. It also allowed individual MIRV payloads to impart different velocities, so that each can be independently targeted to a different target, albeit in nearby vicinity of each other. As before the RV continued to be passive and purely ballistic. The Agni-RV Mk.2 is more advanced than the western RVs, because it embodies proposition, navigation and control all the way to the target. The RV re-enters at an altitude of 100 km, at a shallow angle, with a gliding trajectory [38]. However it does not carry a MIRV payload.

Key Features of the Agni-RV Mk.2

  1. The manoeuvring fins that allows it to;
    • Execute a non-ballistic trajectory to make interception more difficult.
    • Overcome any perturbation due to high altitude atmospheric disturbance.
    • Enable use of body lift at hypersonic velocity to glide the missile over longer ranges, thus reducing the thermal and physical stress at a modified Max-Q point.
    • Trajectory error to be determined late into the fight and corrected using aerodynamic force during re-entry.
    • Terminal manoeuvre dive for a more acute target interdiction angle improving CEP.
    • Support a wider range of payload weight and configuration.
  2. Integrated velocity correction package for greater precision; has a set of solid fuelled cartridge(s) that are used to correct impulse variances of solid fuelled stages and subtle launch trajectory perturbation.
  3. Integrated High Altitude Motor (HAM) which is liquid fuelled. Depending on the actual payload configuration, the HAM fuel load can be increased to trade range for a lighter and more compact weapon.
  4. Larger internal volume allows more sophisticated ABM (anti-ballistic missile) counter-measures.

Avionics, Navigation and Control

The Agni family of missiles uses a strap-down INS system for flight control and navigation. Necessary inertial sensors were indigenously developed for the purpose, including laser rate gyros.

Agni-II introduced a new concept in missile control system by adopting MIL-STD-1553 databus for all on-board communication and control device interconnection --> mainly INS system, Flight Control Computer, actuators and sensors [42]. It is the standard that is adopted in new civilian & military aircraft (circuit routing and device mounting) and all the software in the Agni-II has been designed around this bus. DRDO sources claim that this reduces the number of connections and also makes the missile more rugged. However, some missile analysts feel that a standard databus may not be the best path to follow. It is said that a customized databus is better because in a standard databus, one tends to use off-the-shelf electronic devices whose performance may not be optimal. However most new missiles are moving towards digital buses using commercial off-the-shelf technology and which enables affordable sub-system replacement.

Accuracy

The Agni-II's navigation and aiming uses an advanced ground based beacon system using a TDOA (Time Delay Of Arrival) technique, similar to a GPS system, that constantly provides missile flight position and velocity updates and has been proven in test flights. The TDOA system reportedly improved the accuracy by three times. India has demonstrated a measure of mastery in navigation sensors and flight control through its space program. The placement accuracy in GTO (involving powered flight of 1000 seconds much of it in sub-G or gravity free environment) is far more complicated and delicate than that of the sub-orbital trajectory of an IRBM. Thus the GSLV-D2 and F01 GTO Apogee accuracy of 1965 PPM and 361 PPM respectively that compares with Agni-II's 40 meter CEP at IRBM ranges with 13 PPM accuracy.

It is worthwhile to note that INS error differs for a ballistic missile versus an aircraft. Ballistic missile accuracy is only dependent on the INS accuracy up to the point when rocket fuel is expended (100 seconds for Agni-II) and it exits the atmosphere (> 90 km altitude), after that the trajectory is purely ballistic that is predetermined and easily computed. INS in a combat aircraft requires continuous operation of IMU and navigation computer throughout the flight during which the error keeps building as IMU sensors drift. A ballistic missile that can update its position and velocity from auxiliary means, can completely eliminate the built up error from INS and continue flight at a precise predetermined path, if necessary correcting the launch error by using:

  1. Small velocity correction thruster package and/or
  2. Aerodynamic manoeuvring during re-entry (this requires active RV configuration with integrated INS and control system).

The Agni-II missile reportedly makes use of both the above techniques. The Agni-II exits atmosphere and expends the second stage at an altitude of 120 km and at a distance of about 150 km. This allows the ground based TDOA system to operate well within Indian Territory and at close range (i.e. robustness against Electronic Warfare interference). The missile maintains LOS (line of sight) well beyond apogee. The overall accuracy is the cumulated sum of:

  1. Accuracy of determining geographic coordinate of target and launcher.
  2. Accuracy of hitting the designated coordinates that is determined by missile's navigation and control system.

Launching the Agni from a surveyed site is one aspect of item 1 above. The sub-meter target coordinates, using national surveillance assets, (aerospace, sensors, etc) would largely address the accuracy of target coordinate designation. A long-range ballistic missile (passive RV) targeting error is typically spread in a highly elliptic pattern. The CEP is thus adversely biased by a wide error spread in a longitudinal axis (due to shallow incidence angle). The Agni's active manoeuvring RV with onboard IMU (INS) and control system can perform terminal manoeuvre to correct errors and make a more accurate top attack profile using greater incidence angle significantly reducing the longitudinal spread and overall CEP.

Range

The Bharat_Rakshak Agni page » MISSILE ARMOURY » AGNI - STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE has extensive data and analysis that uses public domain data and ballistic calculations to show that the range is greatly influenced by use or non-use of thrusters on the RV (required for velocity trimming) for propulsion as a HAM (High Altitude Motor). There seems to be room in the RV for about ~200 kg fuel (solid or liquid) after allowing for a long but lightweight TN weapon. This RV integrated HAM is referred to as the half stage after the two solid fuelled stages. This stage provides a disproportional increase in range for a lighter RV payload. Thus development of lightweight nuclear weapons is paramount to the missile's range.

When the Agni-II was first launched, then Defence Minister George Fernandes indicated that the maximum range of the Agni-II was 3000 km. Since then, ranges from 2000 km to 2500 km have been bandied about while Dr. Kalam, at Aero India '98, stated that Agni-II had a maximum range of 3,700 km! The range of 2000 km can be excluded, as the system has been tested to greater range in both 1999 and 2001. Given the test to 2300 km in 1999 and 2100 km in 2001, with an apparently lighter payload, would indicate that a variation in trajectory was used and it may be possible to extrapolate some more accurate estimates of Agni-II's maximum range.

It would appear that Agni-II has a theoretical ability to hit a target 3000 km away with a 1000 kg overall payload – (a 250 kg RV's deadweight and a 750 kg warhead). It is suggested that a 200 kiloton 'boosted fission' warhead was earlier developed for the Agni system when it was on the drawing board in the late 80s, however after the Pokhran-II series of nuclear test in May 1998, the 200 KT boosted fission design has clearly given way to a 200 - 300 KT two stage thermonuclear design that is expected to be much lighter. From the tables at Effect of payload and stage configuration on Agni-II range, one can see that a number of permutations and combinations are available to DRDO based on the existing Agni-II design and Indian propulsion technology. Range changes can be made by either varying the payload or by altering the engine configuration.

Given the available data, it is therefore clear that Agni-II has a maximum range of somewhere in excess of 3000 km, and possibly as high as 3500 km with a 1000 kg payload. Greater range with a lighter payload however requires the RV to be qualified for higher re-entry velocity and corresponding Max-Q for thermal stress.

Conclusion

As the backbone of the Indian land-based nuclear deterrent, the real significance of the Agni-II is the fact that it is both road and rail mobile. This is an indication of India's desire not to put its missiles into vulnerable silos. The mobility of the Agni-II, combined with the sheer physical size of India renders the mobile IRBM a very secure and survivable delivery system. Its range of strategic weapons payload and good accuracy make this strategic weapon useful for counter value as well as first strike role.


Wednesday, December 3, 2008

SI electricity units

edit

SI electromagnetism units

Symbol [citation needed]

Name of Quantity

Derived Units

Unit

Base Units

I

Magnitude of current

ampere (SI base unit)

A

A = W/V = C/s

q

Electric charge, Quantity of electricity

coulomb

C

A·s

U

Potential difference or Electromotive force

volt

V

J/C = kg·m2·s−3·A−1

R, Z, X

Resistance, Impedance, Reactance

ohm

Ω

V/A = kg·m2·s−3·A−2

ρ

Resistivity

ohm metre

Ω·m

kg·m3·s−3·A−2

P

Power, Electrical

watt

W

V·A = kg·m2·s−3

C

Capacitance

farad

F

C/V = kg−1·m−2·A2·s4

 

Elastance

reciprocal farad

F−1

V/C = kg·m2·A−2·s−4

ε

Permittivity

farad per metre

F/m

kg−1·m−3·A2·s4

χe

Electric susceptibility

(dimensionless)

-

-

G, Y, B

Conductance, Admittance, Susceptance

siemens

S

Ω−1 = kg−1·m−2·s3·A2

σ

Conductivity

siemens per metre

S/m

kg−1·m−3·s3·A2

H

Magnetic field, magnetic field intensity

ampere per metre

A/m

A·m−1

Φm

Magnetic flux

weber

Wb

V·s = kg·m2·s−2·A−1

B

Magnetic flux density, magnetic induction, magnetic field strength

tesla

T

Wb/m2 = kg·s−2·A−1 = N·A−1·m−1

 

Reluctance

ampere-turn per weber

A/Wb

kg−1·m−2·s2·A2

L

Inductance

henry

H

Wb/A = V·s/A = kg·m2·s−2·A−2

μ

Permeability

henry per metre

H/m

kg·m·s−2·A−2

χm

Magnetic susceptibility

(dimensionless)

-

-

Friday, November 21, 2008

List of countries by number of active troops



Number of active troops per country
This is a list of countries sorted by the total number of active troops where the military manpower of a country is measured by the total amount of active troops within the command of that country. Reserved forces which can aid a depleted active military and/or paramilitary are also listed to illustrate a country's total


Rank  ↓

Flag

Nation  ↓

Active Service Personnel  ↓

Reserve Force  ↓

Paramilitary  ↓

Total  ↓

Active troops per thousand citizens  ↓

1

Flag of the People's Republic of China

People's Republic of China**

2,255,000[1]

800,000[1]

3,969,000[1]

7,024,000

1.71

2

Flag of the United States

United States**

1,426,026[2]

1,458,500[2]

53,000[2]

2,937,526

4.76

3

Flag of India

India**

1,325,000[3]

1,155,000[3]

1,293,300[3]

3,773,300

1.20

4

Flag of North Korea

North Korea**

1,106,000[4]

4,700,000[4]

189,000[4]

5,995,000

49.03

5

Flag of Russia

Russia**

1,037,000[5]

2,400,000[6]

359,100[7]

3,796,100

7.24

6

Flag of South Korea

South Korea

687,000[8]

4,500,000[8]

22,000[8]

5,209,000

14.20

7

Flag of Pakistan

Pakistan**

619,000[9]

528,000[9]

302,000[9]

1,449,000

3.72

8

Flag of Iran

Iran

545,000[10]

350,000[11]

11,390,000[12]

12,285,000

11.74

9

Flag of Turkey

Turkey

514,850[13]

380,000[14]

148,700[15]

1,043,550

7.03

10

Flag of Vietnam

Vietnam

484,000[16]

4,000,000[16]

5,080,000[16]

9,564,000

5.79

11

Flag of Egypt

Egypt

450,000[17]

254,000[17]

405,000[18]

1,109,000

5.81

12

Flag of Burma

Myanmar

428,250[19]

0[20]

72,000[citation needed]

500,250

7.42

13

Flag of Indonesia

Indonesia

410,000[21]

400,000[21]

207,000[22]

1,008,000

1.26

14

Flag of France

France**

361,085[23]

419,000 [24]

0

780,085

4.27

15

Flag of Thailand

Thailand

306,600[25]

200,000[26]

113,700[27]

625,300

4.80

16

Flag of Syria

Syria

296,000[28]

132,500[28]

108,000[29]

536,500

15.89

17

Flag of the Republic of China

Republic of China (Taiwan)

290,000[30]

1,653,500[30]

22,000[30]

1,965,000

12.70

18

Flag of Brazil

Brazil

287,000[31]

1,115,000[31]

285,600[31]

1,687,600

1.55

19

Flag of Germany

Germany

284,500[32]

358,650[33]

40,000[34]

683,150

3.45

20

Flag of Colombia

Colombia

280,000[35]

0[35]

140,000[35]

420,000

4.66

21

Flag of Japan

Japan

238,000[36]

57,899[37]

12,250[37]

308,149

1.88

22

Flag of Eritrea

Eritrea

202,000[38]

250,000[39]

0[40]

452,000

45.90

23

Flag of Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia

199,500[41]

20,000[42]

15,000[43]

234,500

6.80

24

Flag of Morocco

Morocco

196,300[44]

150,000[45]

75,000[45]

421,800

6.81

25

Flag of Mexico

Mexico

192,770[46]

300,000[46]

25,000[46]

517,770

1.82

26

Flag of Ukraine

Ukraine

191,000[47]

1,000,000[48]

112,500[49]

1,303,500

4.12

27

Flag of the United Kingdom

United Kingdom**

187,970[50]

233,860[50]

1[50]

421,831

3.09

28

Flag of Ethiopia

Ethiopia

182,500[51]

0[52]

0[52]

182,500

2.44

29

Flag of Iraq

Iraq ***

180,000[53]

0[53]

227,000[53]

407,000

5.95

30

Flag of Spain

Spain

177,950[54]

328,500[54]

72,600[55]

579,050

3.49

31

Flag of Greece

Greece

177,600[56]

291,000[56]

4,000[56]

472,600

16.60

32

Flag of Israel

Israel*

168,000[57]

408,000[58]

8,050[59]

584,050

23.90

33

Flag of Italy

Italy

169,000[60]

65,200[60]

238,800[61]

534,350

3.42

34

Flag of Poland

Poland

163,000[62]

234,000[62]

21,300[62]

418,300

4.23

35

Flag of Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka

157,900[63]

5,500[63]

88,600[63]

252,000

7.59

36

Flag of Bangladesh

Bangladesh

150,000[64]

0[64]

64,000[64]

214,000

0.87

37

Flag of Algeria

Algeria

127,500[65]

150,000[21]

60,000[66]

337,500

3.92

38

Flag of Cambodia

Cambodia

124,300[67]

0[68]

67,000[68]

191,000

9.19

39

Flag of Switzerland

Switzerland

120,000[69]

80,000[69]

0[69]

220,000

15.81

40

Flag of the Philippines

Philippines

113,500[70]

131,000[70]

158,500[70]

403,000

1.21

42

Flag of Malaysia

Malaysia

110,000[71]

41,600[72]

20,100[72]

171,000

3.97

43

Flag of Peru

Peru

110,000[73]

188,000[73]

77,000[73]

375,000

3.58

44

Flag of Sudan

Sudan

104,500[74]

0[75]

95,000[75]

199,500

2.60

45

Flag of Jordan

Jordan

100,700[76]

35,000[77]

10,000[77]

145,700

17.40

46

Flag of Angola

Angola

100,000[78]

N/A

N/A

100,000

10.60

47

Flag of Romania

Romania

90,000[79]

0[79]

79,900[79]

173,519

4.31

48

Flag of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Democratic Republic of the Congo

83,800[80]

0[80]

1,400[81]

85,200

1.63

49

Flag of Venezuela

Venezuela

82,300[82]

100,000[82]

600,000[83]

782,500

3.24

50

Flag of Chile

Chile

80,500[84]

50,000[84]

36,800[84]

167,300

4.75

51

Flag of Belarus

Belarus

79,800[85]

289,500[85]

110,000[85]

479,300

7.08

52

Flag of Nigeria

Nigeria

78,500[86]

0[86]

82,000[86]

160,500

0.61

53

Flag of Libya

Libya

76,000[87]

40,000[88]

3,000[88]

119,000

13.20

54

Flag of Lebanon

Lebanon

72,100[89]

0[89]

13,000[90]

85,100

19.80

55

Flag of Argentina

Argentina

71,800[91]

0[91]

47,240[92]

119,040

1.81

56

Flag of Afghanistan

Afghanistan

70,000[93]

0[93]

0[93]

70,000

2.34

57

Flag of Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan

65,800[94]

237,000[94]

34,500[94]

337,300

4.33

58

Flag of Yemen

Yemen

65,000[95]

40,000[96]

70,000[96]

175,000

3.22

59

Flag of Canada

Canada

65,000[97]

24,000[97]

9,350[98]

98,350

2.95

60

Flag of Nepal

Nepal

63,000[99]

0[99]

15,000[99]

78,000

2.28

61

Flag of Rwanda

Rwanda

61,000[100]

0[100]

10,000[100]

71,000

6.04

62

Flag of Singapore

Singapore

60,500[101]

312,500[101]

96,300[101]

469,300

16.40

63

Flag of Armenia

Armenia

60,000[102]

300,000

10,000[102]

370,000

13.00

64

Flag of Uganda

Uganda

60,000[103]

0[103]

1,800[103]

61,800

2.20

65

Flag of Ecuador

Ecuador

59,500[104]

100,000[104]

18,000[105]

177,500

4.45

66

Flag of the Czech Republic

Czech Republic

57,050[106]

0[106]

5,600[107]

62,650

5.57

67

Flag of South Africa

South Africa

55,750[108]

N/A

N/A

55,750

1.26

68

Flag of Australia

Australia

53,572[109]

20,300[110]

0[110]

73,872

1.25

69

Flag of the Netherlands

Netherlands

53,130[111]

32,200[111]

3,300[112]

88,630

3.24

70

Flag of Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan

53,000[113]

0[113]

19,000[113]

72,000

1.96

71

Flag of Croatia

Croatia

50 500[114]

130 200[114]

N/A[115]

64,500

 

72

Flag of Bulgaria

Bulgaria

51,000[116]

303,000[116]

34,000[116]

385,450

7.85

73

Flag of the United Arab Emirates

United Arab Emirates

50,500[117]

0[118]

0[118]

50,500

14.50

74

Flag of Cuba

Cuba

46,000[119]

39,000[119]

1,146,500[119]

1,231,500

4.05

75

Flag of Portugal

Portugal

44,900[120]

210,930[120]

25,600[121]

281,430

4.25

76

Flag of Oman

Oman

41,700[122]

0[123]

10,800[123]

52,500

11.90

77

Flag of Belgium

Belgium

40,800[124]

100,500[124]

0[124]

141,300

3.94

78

Flag of Burundi

Burundi

40,000[125]

0[125]

5,500[126]

45,500

7.93

79

Flag of Serbia

Serbia

38,000[127]

207,500[127]

110,000[127]

392,500

7.08

80

Flag of Finland

Finland

36,700[128]

485,000[128]

3,100[129]

524,800

5.17

81

Flag of Tunisia

Tunisia

35,000[130]

0[131]

12,000[131]

47,000

3.47

82

Flag of Austria

Austria

34,600[132]

72,000[132]

N/A

106,600

4.23

83

Flag of Sweden

Sweden

33,900[133]

262,000[133]

38,650[citation needed]

334,550

3.41

84

Flag of Hungary

Hungary

33,400[134]

90,300[134]

12,000[135]

135,700

3.31

85

Flag of Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

32,000[136]

0[136]

21,800[136]

53,800

2.28

86

Flag of Bolivia

Bolivia

31,500[137]

0[137]

37,100[137]

68,600

3.56

87

Flag of Guatemala

Guatemala

31,400[138]

35,000[138]

19,000[138]

85,400

2.14

88

Flag of Chad

Chad

30,350[139]

0[140]

4,500[140]

34,850

3.09

89

Flag of Laos

Laos

29,100[141]

0[141]

100,000[141]

129,100

4.68

90

Flag of Norway

Norway

27,600[142]

219,000[142]

29,400

276,000

5.79

91

Flag of Tanzania

Tanzania

27,000[143]

80,000[143]

1,400[143]

108,400

0.73

92

Flag of Slovakia

Slovakia

26,200[144]

20,000[144]

4,700[145]

50,900

4.05

93

Flag of Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan

26,000[146]

0[146]

0[146]

26,000

5.86

94

Flag of the Dominican Republic

Dominican Republic

24,500[147]

0[147]

15,000[147]

39,500

2.74

95

Flag of Kenya

Kenya

24,120[148]

0[148]

5,000[148]

29,120

0.71

96

Flag of Uruguay

Uruguay

24,000[149]

0[149]

920[149]

24,920

7.03

97

Flag of Cameroon

Cameroon

23,100[150]

0[150]

9,000[150]

32,100

1.41

98

Flag of Denmark

Denmark

22,880[151]

64,900[151]

61,500[151]

149,280

4.24

99

Flag of Zambia

Zambia

21,600[152]

0[152]

1,400[152]

23,000

1.61

101

Flag of Albania

Albania

20,000[153]

0[153]

5,000[154]

25,000

6.17

102

Flag of Paraguay

Paraguay

18,600[155]

164,500[155]

14,800[155]

197,900

2.93

103

Flag of Georgia (country)

Georgia

17,500[156]

250,000[156]

11,700[156]

279,200

2.74

104

Flag of Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire

17,050[157]

0[157]

7,000[157]

24,050

0.99

105

Flag of El Salvador

El Salvador

16,800[158]

9,900

12,000[158]

38,700

2.31

106

Flag of Mauritania

Mauritania

15,750[159]

N/A

4,500[160]

20,250

5.10

107

Flag of Kuwait

Kuwait

15,500[161]

24,000[162]

6,600[163]

46,100

6.64

108

Flag of Nicaragua

Nicaragua

14,000[164]

0[164]

0[164]

14,000

2.56

109

Flag of Lithuania

Lithuania

13,510[165]

309,200[165]

14,390[165]

337,100

3.53

110

Flag of Madagascar

Madagascar

13,500[166]

0[166]

8,100[167]

21,600

0.75

111

Flag of Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone

13,000[168]

0[168]

0[168]

13,000

1.33

112

Flag of Liberia

Liberia

13,000[169]

0[169]

0[169]

13,000

3.90

113

Flag of the Republic of Macedonia

Republic of Macedonia

12,850[170]

60,000[170]

7,600[170]

80,450

6.28

114

Flag of Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan

12,500[171]

57,000[171]

5,000[171]

74,500

2.12

115

Flag of Qatar

Qatar

12,400[172]

0[173]

0[173]

12,400

14.40

116

Flag of Bahrain

Bahrain

11,200[174]

0[175]

10,160[175]

21,360

15.4

117

Flag of Ireland

Ireland

10,500[176]

14,000[176]

0[176]

24,500

2.53

118

Flag of Cyprus

Cyprus

10,000[177]

60,000[177]

750[177]

70,750

12.80

119

Flag of Mozambique

Mozambique

10,000[178]

0[178]

0[178]

10,000

0.42

120

Flag of the Republic of the Congo

Republic of the Congo

10,000[179]

0[179]

2,000[179]

12,000

3.29

121

Flag of Djibouti

Djibouti

9,850[180]

0[181]

1,400[181]

11,250

20.70

122

Flag of Guinea

Guinea

9,700[182]

0[182]

9,600[182]

19,300

1.02

123

Flag of Togo

Togo

9,450[183]

0[183]

750[183]

10,200

1.50

124

Flag of Slovenia

Slovenia

9,000[184]

20,000[184]

4,500[185]

33,500

1.21

125

Flag of Senegal

Senegal

9,400[186]

0[186]

5,800[186]

15,200

1.02

126

Flag of Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau

9,250[187]

0[187]

2,000[187]

11,250

6.53

127

Flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina

9,200[188]

0[188]

0[188]

9,200

3.92

128

Flag of Mongolia

Mongolia

9,100[189]

137,000[189]

7,200[189]

152,800

3.08

129

Flag of Botswana

Botswana

9,000[190]

0[190]

1,500[190]

10,500

5.49

130

Flag of Namibia

Namibia

9,000[191]

0[191]

6,000[191]

15,000

4.43

131

Flag of New Zealand

New Zealand

8,949[192]

2,228[192]

0[192]

11,117

2.69

132

Flag of Honduras

Honduras

8,300[193]

60,000[193]

6,000[193]

74,300

1.72

133

Flag of Mali

Mali

7,350[194]

0[194]

4,800[194]

12,150

0.60

134

Flag of Moldova

Moldova

7,200[195]

66,000[195]

4,300[195]

77,500

1.74

135

Flag of Brunei

Brunei

7,000[196]

0[196]

3,750[196]

10,750

18.80

136

Flag of Ghana

Ghana

7,000[197]

0[197]

0[197]

7,000

0.33

137

Flag of Montenegro

Montenegro

6,500[citation needed]

0

0

6,500

 

138

Flag of Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso

6,000[198]

45,000[198]

1,800[199]

52,800

0.78

139

Flag of Tajikistan

Tajikistan

6,000[200]

0[200]

1,200[200]

7,200

0.84

140

Flag of Estonia

Estonia

5,700[201]

39,000[201]

11,000[201]

55,700

4.13

141

Flag of Latvia

Latvia

5,500[202]

14,050[202]

3,200[202]

22,750

2.13

142

Flag of Niger

Niger

5,300[203]

0[203]

5,400[203]

10,700

0.37

143

Flag of Malawi

Malawi

5,300[204]

0[204]

1,500[205]

6,800

0.44

144

Flag of Gabon

Gabon

4,700[206]

0[206]

1,500[207]

6,200

3.38

145

Flag of Benin

Benin

4,550[208]

0[208]

3,000[209]

7,550

0.61

146

Flag of Transnistria

Transnistria

4,500[210]

15,000[210]

2,000[210]

21,500

38.73

147

Flag of Fiji

Fiji

3,500[211]

6,000[211]

0[211]

9,500

3.92

148

Flag of Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea

3,100[212]

0[212]

0[212]

3,100

0.56

149

Flag of Jamaica

Jamaica

2,830[213]

953[213]

0[213]

3,783

1.04

150

Flag of Trinidad and Tobago

Trinidad and Tobago

2,700[214]

0[214]

0[214]

2,700

2.48

151

Flag of Malta

Malta

2,140[215]

0[215]

0[215]

2,140

5.37

152

Flag of Lesotho

Lesotho

2,000[216]

0[216]

0[216]

2,000

1.07

153

Flag of Suriname

Suriname

1,840[217]

0[217]

0[217]

1,840

4.20

154

Flag of Guyana

Guyana

1,600[218]

1,500[218]

0[218]

3,100

2.09

155

Flag of East Timor

Timor-Leste

1,500[219]

0[220]

0[219]

1,500

0.62

156

Flag of the Central African Republic

Central African Republic

1,400[221]

0[221]

1,000[221]

2,400

0.67

157

Flag of Equatorial Guinea

Equatorial Guinea

1,320[222]

0[222]

2,000[223]

3,320

2.46

158

Flag of Cape Verde

Cape Verde

1,200[224]

0[224]

0[224]

1,200

2.87

159

Flag of Belize

Belize

1,050[225]

700[225]

0[225]

1,750

3.76

160

Flag of Luxembourg

Luxembourg

900[226]

0[226]

612[226]

1,512

1.92

161

Flag of the Bahamas

Bahamas

860[227]

0[227]

0[227]

860

2.85

162

Flag of The Gambia

Gambia

800[228]

0[228]

0[228]

800

0.50

163

Flag of Barbados

Barbados

610[229]

430[229]

0[229]

1,040

2.18

164

Flag of the Seychelles

Seychelles

450[230]

0[230]

250[230]

700

5.54

165

Flag of Tonga

Tonga

450[231]

0[231]

0[231]

450

4.41

166

Flag of Antigua and Barbuda

Antigua and Barbuda

170[232]

75[232]

0[232]

245

2.47